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ABSTRACT 
In many parts of the world, whether “developing” or “developed,” the concept of a rural sort of 
education is largely ignored by national ministries. The United States is just one notable example 
of silence at the bureaucratic center, despite scholarly interest in provincial universities. The 
future may change the “terms of engagement,” however, and this essay considers the leadership 
of  rural  schools  and  communities  from  the  vantage  of  the  daunting,  but  clearly  visible, 
challenges of the future. The challenges described in the essay relate to a variety of visible, 
perhaps even familiar, economic, environmental, political, and cultural threats confronting life 
in the coming century. Though increasingly important and relevant to education, these threats 
are not a common part of discussions in education policy. The essay explains why, and why the 
threats  are  important  to  rural  villages  and  districts.  Discussion  concludes  with  five  rurally 
appropriate  shifts  of  thinking  that  might  help  rural  citizens  and  subjects  around  the  world 
engage the challenges and counter the threats. 
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THE COMING VITALITY OF RURAL PLACES 
Observers with varied outlooks (e.g., Berry, 1977; Orr, 1995a; Bowers, 2004; Kunstler, 
2005; Conklin, 2008; Mathez, 2009) argue that the human project is treading a path into the 
dangerous future that even those with overweening power and ambition cannot sustain, despite 
the fact that they have engineered such a future. Indeed, those whose thinking is enslaved to the 
idea of unlimited economic growth have become increasingly shrill about the sort of schooling 
their doomed vision requires, and they have squeezed public educators everywhere to bend 
their efforts to the vision. 
In the vision of unlimited growth, rural places become cultural backwaters and zones for 
the exploitation of “natural resources” that belong mostly to the sovereign State and not to local 
people (Williams, 1989; Scott, 1999; Said, 2004). More than this, such metropolitan centers as 
New  York,  Istanbul,  and  Beijing,  and  Paris  exercise  cultural  and  political  dominion 
internationally.  They  hold  their  respective  nations  together  politically,  linguistically  and 
economically. The great critic and supporter of cities, Jane Jacobs believed national economies 
were fictions: cities did it all (Jacobs, 1961, 1986). 
To question the necessity of unlimited economic growth3, however, is to question the 
assumption of inevitable rural decline and eventual disappearance (as a cultural, political, and 
economic reality).  This essay  does  question  the  idea  of  unlimited  growth  and  cosmopolitan 
hegemony as an undoubted character of the future world. Instead, it asks readers to consider 
emerging threats to the extant neo-liberal order under which rural ways of living and loving, 
knowing and being, are supposed to wither away.  
I  just  turned  65  years  of  age,  and  I  resent  the  inevitable.  More  than  that,  my  most 
important education has been by rural villagers and neighbors. I think rural will persist even as 
the experience of rural, like all cultural forms, continues its evolution. Because all this comprises 
a cultural question, it is also is the most important education of all—who are we and what shall 
we become? Rural ways of living provide longstanding and I think durable answers. 
 
The Status Quo: Mission Impossible 
  Heraclitus (born near Selçuk, in fact, at Efes, about 535 BCE) famously noted that one 
cannot step twice into the same river. The river changes, but so do we; our cultural forms, 
moreover, are very much like rivers, and sometimes their changes of course are dramatic or 
catastrophic. When the changes are numerous and transpire at a planetary scale, the potential 
for difficulties expands dramatically, perhaps catastrophically.  
  Today portents of major changes in global cultural flow are easy to read (if harder to 
interpret for the future):  (1) steady depletion of cheap energy reserves (Heinberg, 2005); (2) 
climate change forced by the incineration of the dwindling fossil reserves (Mathez, 2009); (3) 
other sorts of depletion, especially of water and the unreplenishable reserves known as “fossil 
water” (Solomon, 2010); (4) other sorts of pollution, especially by chemical inputs to farming—
fertilizers made from cheap energy reserves like natural gas, and pesticides (Conklin, 2008); (5) 
wildly increasing demand on dwindling cheap energy reserves (and on much else; see Angus & 
Butler, 2011) in “developing” nations, particularly China (Jacques, 2009) and India, and (6) the 
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weakening sovereignty of the nation-state (“globalization”) under the press of global business 
concerns  (Hobsbawm,  1992;  Sassen,  1996;  Barzun,  2000).  Conklin  (2007)  is  a  conservative 
interpreter  of  these  developments,  but  he  believes  that  the  threats  confronting  this  century 
dwarf those that beset the 20th century (that century of terrible slaughter and dislocation—in 
case any reader needs reminding). 
  In short, the status quo is never supportable, but now it is likely not “sustainable” to use 
a popular term: it seems that a finite earth cannot support unlimited economic growth. It should 
not be the surprise it seemingly is to so many. The daunting threats just recited all proceed from 
devotion  to  a  profound  misconception  of  existential  possibilities.  The  implication,  for  many 
activists and thinkers, is that if humans do not curb their profligacy, they (we) will so damage 
the planet that life will become quite miserable (for them...and for us).  There are many evasions 
of such a realization: religious, political, economic, and certainly educational. This essay considers 
the educational evasions, and the implications for rural people and those teaching the rising 
generation of rural people. 
 
Twenty-First-Century Skills 
What the future holds is frightening, even if unclear, and even if national school leaders 
ignore the evident threats because of vested interest in the status quo. This vested interest and 
related  incapacity  are  evident  in  the  ubiquitous  “twenty-first-century  skills”  pushed  on 
educators as supposedly critical: computers, teamwork, and problem solving. 
Competing  definitions  are  very  easy  to  find  online,  but  whether  identified  by  the 
offending phrase or not, many similar “skill sets” concern digital technology and its imagined 
role in national economic well-being (that is, the role of computers in producing endless growth, 
come what may). Students are said to require “media literacy,” but also to finally adopt and 
“master”  such  “skills”  as  working  in  groups  and  problem  solving.  The  State  and  its  business 
partners insist that such preparation will prepare students for anything, that these “skills” will 
prove fundamental across the century.  
By contrast, if one took seriously the short list of six threats enumerated previously, one 
would  not  shout:  Computers!  Teamwork!  Problem-solving!  Of  course  such  capacities  would  be 
helpful at any historical epoch (surely the Ottoman Empire would have appreciated the use of 
computers) and in any place, including rural villages and farms. Indeed, teamwork and problem 
solving have been hallmarks of farming life (Berry, 1977) since the beginning of agriculture 
(Anatolia was an “early adopter,” circa 6,000-8,000 years ago; see Diamond, 1999). Perhaps the 
business problem is simply that not every living human has a computer just yet, and that it 
might be good for every one of them to have two or three.  But to pay computer manufacturers 
from public funds in order to put a computer into every child’s hands seems a notably bad 
rationale for schooling and a waste of educational resources.4 
Such nonsense has much historical precedent of course. For just one example, in the mid-
20th century US, an influential faction promoted life adjustment skills: “dating, marriage, mating, 
and the rearing of children” (Kliebard, 1986, 252). It was a postwar development, at the time 
when the State began to think everyone should complete high school. The old model of high 
school would not serve the purpose, however, because it was too academic, to intellectual:  
                                                 
4 In the US, some critics of public schools have seemed to think it good that computers might replace schools altogether.   
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Over  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  self-perception  of  school 
administrators had been evolving from that of educators to hard-headed business 
managers, and an education attuned to the real business of life, as opposed to the 
remote values of the academic curriculum, must have had an enormous appeal 
(Kliebard, 1986, 254). 
 
As skills, today’s new ones (“twenty-first century”) are every bit as broad as the old ones 
(“life adjustment”), and they have the same source according to Kliebard: the faction that wants 
schools to help everyone embrace the idea of limitless economic growth, and to buy as much as 
possible—especially (at present) computers. 
This purpose infects even rural education. In North America, for instance, a liberal wing 
of reformers has tended for several decades to advise rural “revitalization” under the banner of 
entrepreneurial development (e.g., Rosenfeld, 1984; Gatewood & DeLargy, 1985; Larson, 1999). 
That is, vital rural places are encouraged to act more like good cities (e.g., Florida, 2004; cf. Carr 
& Kefalas, 2009), just as improved rural schools (in the US) should be designed to look and 
function more like good schools for wealthy metropolitans and cosmopolitans. Some of these 
cited advisers, however, do understand the difference between a village trader and a genuine 
metropolitan “capitalist.” Many who listened to them, however, did not. 
In any case, with deep rural experience of (and respect and affection for) rural ways of 
doing things, knowing the world, and being in it, one can actually grasp the point of a rural sort 
of education. Rural is interesting, challenging, and in need of as much thoughtful care as cities. 
But a rural sort of education barely exists anywhere (especially in the US, I must add). 
The  best  explanation  I  have  for  why  a  rural  sort  of  schooling  does  not  yet  enjoy  a 
substantial existence, however, is that most decision makers and most cosmopolitans believe 
strongly in the deficiency of rural people (Scott, 2012). With such a belief once can easily dismiss 
the theory of a rural sort of education as an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Why? As James 
Scott observes (2012), the nationally powerful believe themselves free to do whatever they like 
with deficient and ignorant people. Again and again, the world over, in Britain, France, the 
United States, Turkey, China, Vietnam, Tanzania, and Thailand the most ignorant and most 
abused have been rural people (Scott, 1998). Often they have exhibited skin color and spoken 
tongues that differ from those of the nation-making rulers at the center: these differences were 
evident even in the nation-building of the European heartland, as in the 19th century France 
described by Weber (1976).  Making Frenchmen required stamping out competing languages 
and ways of being, especially rural ways of being. They became illegal. It’s a very old story in 
history (Barzun, 2000). 
More to the point, according to Scott, such suppositions of deficiency and ignorance have 
proven  themselves  unfounded  across  the experience  of  the  20th  century.  The  national  rulers 
(whether communist, capitalist, or nationalist) far from being expert and knowledgeable, proved 
themselves instead ignorant and dangerous for rural places and their cultural knowledge5—but 
also dangerous for cities6. It goes without saying that misguided planning of this sort, and as a 
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direct  result  of  the  related  social  engineering,  are  bad  for  systems  of  schooling  and  for  the 
education that one might otherwise expect from schools (Scott, 2012, notes many educational 
parallels).  Scott’s  analyses  help  explain  why  those  leading  the  profession  remain  ignorant: 
Whether leading from the inside or the outside, they hear only one story. So far, their ignorance 
does not harm their interests. This situation seems about to change, if the scientists describing 
the coming challenges are even partly correct. 
Twenty-first-century  skills  are  going  to  be  a  poor  preparation  for  the  rural  future. 
Indeed, the coming changes might render rural places across the globe more “vital” than they 
have seemed during the previous century. 
 
World-Class Vitality 
In her 1986 Cities and the Wealth of Nations, Jane Jacobs claimed that cities, and not nation-
states, were the engines of economic growth. Economically speaking, nation-states were a fiction 
in Jacobs’ view. Worse, some nation-states, such as the US, seemed actively to be killing off their 
cities, sorting functions (residential, commercial, manufacturing, transportation) into separate 
geographic zones, rather than promoting a synthesis of all functions across the entire city—a 
synthesis,  she  wrote,  that  fostered  community  (Jacobs,  1961,  1986).  Following  her 
groundbreaking  volume  on  the  decline  of  the  Great  American  city  (Jacobs,  1961),  she  was 
looking for a counterexample. She found it in Italy. 
Her  exemplar  there  was  Reggio-Emilia.  According  to  Jacobs  (1986),  it  succeeded 
precisely because it refused to follow the modernist path for city planning. The city sustained 
well recognizable community in its neighborhoods, and these communities fostered a wide range 
of interaction among residents, notably including economic interaction: 
 
Vital cities have marvelous innate abilities for understanding, communicating, 
contriving, and inventing what is required to combat their difficulties. Lively, 
diverse, intense cities contain the seeds of their own regeneration, with energy 
enough to carry over for problems and needs outside themselves (Jacobs, 1961, 
447). 
 
Notably, Reggio is and was a small city by conventional “world-class” standards. It was 
not “world-class” in the way that Los Angeles and Shanghai are. It was more humanly scaled. 
  Vitality  is  not,  however,  a  quality  Jacobs  would  associate  with  the  countryside.  Her 
“vitality” differs from what one imagines as a vital village or farming district.  But Jacobs (1980, 
1986) did believe that vital cities, like Reggio, had to make use of their “hinterlands.” In any 
case, a more localized rural connection of smaller cities and rural places might well become ever 
more important (for good and ill, let us remember) as the reign of cheap energy comes to a close. 
The relationship would likely remain a very much contested one because, on Jacobs’s terms, 
rural will still probably be subsidiary (for related analyses see Williams, 1989; Soja, 2000; De Blij, 
2009). 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 In some ways both Scott and Jacobs deplore the 20th century city as a social monstrosity.  New York and Los Angeles are among 
Jacobs’ examples, whereas Scott considers Brasilia and Le Corbusier’s unrealized plans for Paris among his bad examples of urban 
“vision.”  
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  The nature of the relationship of small cities to “their” hinterlands may turn on the fate 
of the nation-state, that seemingly permanent political arrangement that began to emerge in 
Europe in the 17th century, in the quest for stability following the civil wars of the Christian 
sectarian struggle (“the Protestant Reformation”).  In the centuries that followed, the theory and 
practice  of  the  nation-state  spread  unevenly  across  the  globe.  Barzun  (a  sober  and  very 
conservative observer) wryly notes: 
 
As for the idea of the nation-state, it is still in the future [i.e., as of 2000] for some 
peoples in various parts of the world. Their struggles are a remote consequence of 
the revolutionary monarch-and-nation idea [that emerged in 17th century Europe], 
as well as a paradox in our time, when kings are few and the nation as a form is 
falling apart in the countries that first made it a reality [emphasis added] (2000, 240). 
   
The grand social construct, and political experiment, represented by the nation-state has 
actually been doubted for some time; in addition to Jacobs’s economic insight,  and Barzun’s 
cultural insight, historian Eric Hobsbawm (1992) observed that the arrangement was always an 
incomplete  historical  process—and  that  it  would  have  an  historical  end  despite  its 
incompleteness. 
  According  to  such  political  theorists  as  Saskia  Sassen  (1996),  globalization  is  one 
important  cause  of  the  ongoing  dissolution  (and  “unevenness”)  of  the  nation  state  (and  its 
incomplete realization). The actors in globalization are hardly the nation-states, much less the 
abstract citizen whose existence justifies nation-states in theory. The real contemporary political 
actors  are  trans-national  corporations:  only  they  can  and  do routinely  take  concerted  global 
action. They are remaking the world every day, all day and all night. And, of course, their global 
actions have local consequences—among nation-states and in local (rural) places within them; 
Sassen calls them the new7 “citizens.” One need, in this light, to understand that globalization is 
as  much  a  political  as  an  economic  phenomenon:  because  globalization  takes  place  within 
nation-states, it erodes nation-states and the idea of the nation-state from within them, as a 
matter of everyday practice (Sassen, 2004). 
To imagine the end of the nation-state or the threats of its demise or radical alternation 
are  perhaps not  unthinkable  among  contemporary  leaders,  but  to expect  discussion  of  such 
matters from them is unrealistic. The leaders, one might say, cannot lead. It’s easy to see why: 
the conditions of extant political, economic, and cultural power depend on the assumptions that 
brought  them  to  power—unlimited  growth,  stable  climate,  and  cheap  energy.  These 
assumptions  represent  the  conditions  of  existence  for  billions  of  humans,  ideologically  and 
materially, and the silence is so widespread that any fear we might feel understanding such 
matters are fully justified (see, e.g., Conkin, 2007). With schooling, one should also remember 
that many national ministries of education deploy a neoliberal ideology that enforces the silence. 
Such silences—and such silencing—always point to the existence of a momentous issue and its 
many related questions.  
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Already, of course, economic growth elects national leaders and economic stagnation 
unseats them; but when rapid economic growth falters for good, what next? What becomes of 
“economics”  itself?  That  modern  discipline  has  itself  known  only  a  regime  based  on  the 
assumption of endless growth. What becomes of politics (including nation states and not only 
governments within them), of energy supply (under conditions of climate change and very high 
cost),  of  culture  (cheap  energy  fuels  the  rituals  of  everyday  life,  too)?  Rural  teachers  and 
administrators and parents had better start asking such questions, and helping villagers and 
farmers and foresters and miners ask them too. The implications are massive.  
 
Back to the Land: Alternative 21st Century Education 
While we remain educators, then, we ought to be up to something very different from 
meeting current expectations, and this insight has implications that will be different for those of 
us  who  remain  devoted  to  rural  places,  communities,  families,  and  children  in  the  coming 
decades  and  generations.  After  all,  despite  the  ignorance  of  so  many  national  “education 
leaders” and the imposition of so much bureaucratic and State baggage, teachers keep teaching. 
This simple fact means there is no way—not really—for the State to exercise effective dominion 
over all of us (see Scott’s 1998 Seeing Like a State for the reasons). 
There is an institution of schooling, on the one hand, and an institution of teaching on 
the other; and good teaching is always in opposition to the goals of schooling (some readers may 
well find this a difficult proposition to accept). Barzun (2000)—a conservative, again—said of the 
institution of schooling that its nature was to ossify: “The school is a government on a small 
scale; it aims at forming a common mind as government aims at a common will. Both need 
periodic overhaul” (p. 180). That’s the institution of schooling. But there is also an institution of 
teaching, which, less subject to stringent control, bites back at the forces of ossification. Genuine 
educators has always had a good idea of what to do: 
 
Change  school  from  a  prison  to  a  scholae  ludus  (play  site),  where  curiosity  is 
aroused and satisfied. Stop beatings. Reduce rote learning and engage the child’s 
interest through music and games and through handling objects, through posing 
problems (the project method), stirring the imagination by dramatic accounts of 
the big world  (2000, 181). 
 
This  is  a  remarkable  characterization  of  the  aims  of  “the  institution  of  teaching,” 
considering that Barzun uses it to characterize a line of school reformers (genuine ones) from the 
17th century forward. One should notice that this durable description of reform has almost nothing 
in common with the aims of the managers, bureaucrats, legislators, and business leaders of neo-
liberal “reform.” It aims at something very different: understanding, thinking, imagination.  
  For the sake of imagination, then, let us imagine the end of endless growth, of cheap 
energy, and the nation-state as we know it. This seems like a radical, perhaps a radically left-
leaning, bit of imagination, but the conservative economist Michael Novak (1981) wrote about 
the significance of this sort of change, looking backward from the capitalist take-off toward the 
pre-industrial norm:  
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Indeed,  in  the  1780s  four-fifths  of  all  French  families  spent  90  percent  of  the 
income simply buying bread—only bread—to stay alive.  In 1800 fewer than 1,000 
people in the whole of Germany had incomes as high as $1,000.  Yet in Great 
Britain from 1800 to 1850, after the sudden capitalist take-off that had begun in 
1780, real wages quadrupled, then quadrupled again between 1850 and 1900. The 
world had never seen anything like it (Novak, 1990, 30). 
 
Kunstler (2005) believes that the world will never see anything like it again. We inhabit 
the pinnacle of the expansion according to some observers. It’s a fabulous moment, they argue: 
enjoy it while it lasts. Only the exact timing of the onset of decline (has it started already?) is in 
doubt, in their view.  
  What’s  rural  got  to  do  with  it  all?    Many  of  those  devoted  to  and  invested  in  the 
phenomenal accumulation enabled by cheap energy  overlook the relevant fact of the durable 
rural world. Eric Hobsbawm began his epic history of the twin revolutions (English industrial 
and French political) that bracketed the onset of the “fabulous moment” with these words: “The 
world of 1789 was overwhelmingly rural, and nobody can understand it that has not absorbed 
this fundamental fact” (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1).  That world looks more and more like a human 
baseline toward which we are moving again. It will not be—this should go without saying—the 
same rural world, but a very different post-expansion and post-industrial one. What will that 
world, and its revised rural portion, preserve of this one? What should it? Before turning to such 
questions, we need to consider the coming morbidity of urban zones.  
 
The Coming Morbidity of Urban Zones  
  It’s a disturbing thesis seldom encountered in academic writing about schooling: the 
global organizing machine (Jacobs, 1986, 2004) as we know it will break down. The reason for 
the avoidance is clear: apocalyptic visions are usually unfounded. But actual catastrophes—as 
compared to those based on prophesies informed by wishful thinking (as with many religious 
visions)—have overtaken humans in the past:  the Black Deaths, the global wars of the previous 
century, and the great pandemic following the first of those wars...and many earlier ones. The 
present thesis has a base in evidence. 
  If the prospect of actual catastrophe seems unlikely, consider the implications: the end of 
cheap energy makes the vertical and horizontal movement of people and goods in and around 
huge cities, and their heating and cooling there, much more difficult (Heinberg, 2005; Kunstler, 
2008). Rising seas would swamp many cities (Mathez, 2009). Of course, even without capitalist 
accumulation (endless economic growth), trade and manufacture would continue to exist; and 
rich and poor would continue their long struggle. But a similar catastrophe has already occurred 
in Cuba (Wright, 2009). When Soviet support disappeared, the State and the people improvised: 
food is now reportedly raised in thousands of urban gardens, more sustainably (i.e, with fewer 
cheap-energy inputs), and with various sorts of State encouragements and supports.  
  So life would likely continue in familiar ways, but on very different terms. One imagines 
that expensive energy would make many things more expensive and more rare (daily hot baths 
and air conditioning, for instance). Of course, such commonplaces of the World-Class nation-
states in Europe and Asia and North America are still unknown in much of the world. The   Eğitim Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi – Journal of Educational Sciences Research 
59 
shock for those places might be less; and this possibility applies to many, many rural villages 
and districts across the globe. 
  More  ominously,  nations  themselves  might  fragment,  of  course—and  such  a 
development  would  predictably  make  cities  more,  not  less,  important.    In  this  case,  their 
“hinterlands”—the nearby rural places—would take on greater importance (cf. Jacobs, 1986). 
The local city and its rural zone would by necessity need to rely more on resources to be found 
nearby: timber, minerals (including fossil fuels), vegetables, livestock for power and food, fiber, 
watersheds, rural manufactures, and possibly room for wind or solar “farms.”  Nearly all of 
these would originate in rural places. Such places would likely become more economically and 
culturally important—and therefore educationally more important than at present (in many parts 
of the world). 
  National  systems  of  schooling  would  predictably  change  with  the  changed  power 
relationships. Maybe they would disappear in disintegrating nations. Thoughtful analysts are 
already worried that public schooling is disappearing in that heartland of globalization, the 
United  States  (Ravitch,  2011).  What  might  replace  nationalized  education  systems  in  such 
circumstances is certainly obscure. But the prospect is worth thinking about. 
 
Dark Age Coming 
  I personally hope for the technical miracle that cheap-energy skeptics (e.g., Heinberg, 
2005; Kunstler, 2005) regard as impossible. But it’s worth asking what the implications of urban-
and-industrial retrenchment might be for rural places, including either schooling or education 
there—or at least what a no-growth economic reality might mean to rural education. 
An exercise like this needs a few well-warranted axioms on which to base speculation.  
Here they are: 
  Human population will rise to 8 billion in 2030 (e.g., United Nations, 2006). 
  A technical solution to keep energy cheap8 is unlikely (e.g., Heinberg, 2005). 
  China and India will continue their industrial florescence (e.g., Jacques, 2009). 
  Climate forcing will continue to be inadequately unaddressed (e.g., Mathez, 2009) 
 
These assumptions are tame enough; none is certain but each is likely, all else equal. 
They at least comprise a parsimonious list, and predicting sharp global dislocations under their 
operation is not so difficult. To predict what will happen exactly, though, is impossible. One 
prediction, though, seems reasonable: “Expensive” means that both goods and money itself are 
in short supply, and whenever such shortages become widely and durably manifest, people will 
turn to self-provisioning and barter if they can: as in contemporary Central Asia following the 
withdrawal of Soviet authority (DeYoung, Reeves & Valyayeva, 2006). 
Now, observe that self-provisioning will be much, much more difficult in the world’s 
mega-cities, which are predicted to contain 60 percent of  world population by 2030 (United 
Nations, 2006). Shortages would predictably be sharpest and most tragic, in the poorest regions, 
                                                 
8 “Cheap energy” needs a short explanation: the comparison is with the energy from draft animals (elephants, oxen, horses, mules, 
camels, llamas, and donkeys) and of course from human limbs. We cannot do by hand or with draft animals everything now done 
with fossil fuels. In the future, therefore, barring the technological miracle, humans will likely do less. One might say that what will 
be done will have to be done more wisely, as well.  
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but  shortages  will  be  general  precisely  because  the  most  developed  nations  are  those  most 
historically dependent on cheap energy. If you’ve ever heated with wood during a viciously 
cold  winter  (as  my  family  has),  you  know  that  freezing  to  death  is  not  just  a  theoretical 
possibility.  
Under conditions of shortage, it is perhaps prudent to entertain a fifth assumption about 
the human carrying capacity of the earth when energy is expensive: 
  The  human  carrying  capacity  of  the  earth  under  changed  conditions  is  4  billion 
individuals (a generous guess, cf. Heinberg, 2005, 31, where it’s 2 billion). 
 
Angus & Butler (2011) caution against  blaming the poor for global warming, energy 
depletion, and rampant pollution of water and air.  They observe, and correctly I think, that a 
just  global  regime  change  could  adequately  support  a  large  human  population:    if  the  rich 
regions relinquished their grip on global resources, if the regime of endless accumulation ended 
well  and  wisely,  if  food  production  were  more  careful  and  local,  and  if  an  effective  global 
movement  for  social  and  ecological  justice  emerged.  Well,  such  a  fine  regime  change  is 
appallingly unlikely worldwide (maybe anywhere) short of a dreadful collapse, and perhaps 
especially not even then: desperation does not encourage thoughtfulness and wisdom, as history 
demonstrates very well.  I do hope for such a change, but I live in a land that already, and 
smugly, blames the poor for a great deal visited upon them by the rich (Gans, 1994). My hope in 
this regard has much in common with my hope for a continuing supply of cheap energy (see 
Cohen, 1995, for the complexities of assessing the earth’s supposed carrying capacity). So: if 4 
billion is correct and world population is currently over 6 billion, and heading for 8 billion, one 
can see the scope of disaster that worries sober, conservative observers like Conkin (2007). 
Conkin (2008, 112), writing about the great agricultural revolution of 1950-1970 observes mildly, 
“Synthetic fertilizers which are made from natural gas are essential for the level of production 
needed to feed the earth’s presently inflated population.” Perhaps some other arrangement will 
be found—but Conkin is not optimistic. 
  In short, all these assumptions together predict an urban-industrial disaster, about which, 
in fact, theorists (e.g., Jacobs, 1961; Berry, 1977; Orr, 1995a) have fretted now for a long time. If 
Jacobs (1986, 2004) is right, though, some cities will survive somehow, and their relationships to 
their rural hinterlands will have to be very strong to enable that survival.  
 
The Coming Vitality of Rural Places 
An American journalist (Rosenthal, 2013), having recently learned that a Swedish city 
heated all its buildings (including homes) with gas from waste from farms, woods, and food 
processing,  recommended  it  to  her  fellow  American  citizens.  They  couldn’t  imagine  the 
possibility, but she observed: “I’d venture that a similar plan could work fine in Milwaukee 
[Wisconsin] or Burlington [Vermont], cities that also anchor rural areas” (15).  Here’s where 
Jacobs’s  city-centered  views  have  relevance  for  the  future  (Jacobs,  1961,  1986,  2004).  Under 
conditions of sharper and sharper energy shortfall, instead of a further clearing out of rural 
places (predicted by the cited UN report), rural places would be likely sites of organized re-
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Food  production  would  rely  necessarily  less  on  large  machines  and  employ  more 
intensive  and  attentive  methods  of  land  care:  in  short,  it  would  require  more  farmers:  more 
people will need to participate in raising, processing, and transporting food. To eat well, and 
perhaps to survive, everyone who can farm or garden will do so (DeYoung et al., 2006; Wright, 
2009). And those who cannot will need friends and relatives who do farm and garden. If 2 
percent (US) to 5 percent (Ireland) of people in the developed world are now involved with 
“agriculture” in some way, perhaps five to ten times that proportion (10-50% is a pretty wide 
margin) will actually farm 100 years or more in the future. The proportion is quite debatable, of 
course, and local variation is appropriate9: but the need for a substantial increase in farmers is a 
simple corollary to the assumptions. Some readers will live to see where all this leads. We now 
turn to specific implications for rural education. 
 
Education Then   
Rural educators need to prepare for the future in very, very different ways from those 
being forced on them now. Fifteen years ago the environmental educator David Orr (1995b) 
counseled educators everywhere to “re-ruralize education.”  He was predictably ignored, but 
such counsel is becoming increasingly relevant. This final section, then, is not a reactionary 
glance toward any golden age of pre-industrial agriculture (about 1880 in the US, perhaps right 
now in Turkey), but toward quite moderate suggestions for an alternative. In particular I want 
to recommend actions that anyone might take to get started on the advised “re-ruralization.”  
  These recommendations include the familiar and the unfamiliar, the uncontroversial and 
the dangerous. Each entails very difficult professional work over a very long trajectory, perhaps 
generations. I’m not advising reform.  I’m not advising revitalization.  I’m not advising revolution.  
I am advising hard thinking and hard work, and local collaboration with other local people. 
Obviously one hopes for improvement, but engineering improvement is proven hubris (Scott, 
1998). It makes more sense to get busy locally.  Here are the recommendations: 
  One.  Turn off the sound. Abandon the national aims, the national discourse, and the 
national standards. The first two are irrelevant, but the last remains partially relevant:  you will 
do better. 
  Two.  Smell the roses (i.e., look for the good, the significant, the useful, the lovely; enjoy 
the looking). What’s useful in national standards can be retrieved, loosely, and better developed 
as a place-sustaining education, even a place-sustaining form of schooling and teaching.10 You 
will do better. 
  Three.  Redefine “success” as the ability to live well locally. This redefinition will become 
easier as you lower the volume (see “One”).  Embrace a measure of smart poverty. Do better: 
share. 
  Four.  Find ways to work with rural communities to establish enterprises that will help 
transition the local place to an expensive-energy world. The number of possibilities is large, 
even daunting. Almost any of them, done well, is better than the alternative (see “One”). Try it. 
                                                 
9 Turkey currently employs 25% of its workforce in agriculture (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). 
10 This observation, by the way, applies especially to mathematics education (Howley, Showalter, Howley, Howley, Klein, & Johnson, 
2011).  
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  Five.  Under  conditions  of  hardship  and  stress,  egalitarian  communities  seem  better 
positioned  to  confront  challenges.  Work  for  social  justice  locally.  This  action  will  be  very 
difficult in rural schools that are currently operated to reproduce whatever inequities prevail. 
Doing worse is not an option for genuine educators. 
  Actual twenty-first-century skills may be very different from what the current crop of 
globalization fanatics imagine. I myself find that the most useful “twenty-first-century skills” to 
be the ones that seem most durably and significantly human: the capacity to think, especially to 
think more freely and widely than the surrounding society. It always was an uphill struggle and 
remains so: perhaps that’s what makes it human. Such thinking was once the preserve of cities, 
but in the future rural villages and the countryside could prove themselves the more human 
place to live and work and think. 
 
REFERENCES 
Angus, I., & Butler, S. (2011). Too many people? Population, immigration, and the environmental crisis.  
Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row. 
Berry,  W.  (1977).  The  unsettling  of  America:  Culture  &  agriculture.  San  Francisco:  Sierra  Club 
Books. 
Bowers,  C. A. (2004).  Revitalizing  the  commons  or an  individualized approach  to  planetary 
citizenship: The choice before us. Educational Studies, 36(1), 45-58. 
Carr, P., & Kefalas, M. (2009). Hollowing out the middle: The rural brain drain and what it means for 
America. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  of  the  United  States.  (2013).  World  factbook  (online).  Turkey. 
Retrieved  from  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tu.html 
Cohen, J. (1995). How many people can the earth support? New York: Norton. 
Conkin, P. (2007). The state of the earth. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press. 
Conkin, P. (2008). A revolution down on the farm: The transformation of American agriculture since 
1929. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. 
De Blij, H. (2009). The power of place: Geography, destiny, and globalization’s rough landscape. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
DeYoung, A., Reeves, M., & Valyayeva, G. (2006). Surviving the transition? Case studies of schools 
and schooling in the Krygyz Republic since independence. Greenwich, CT: Information Age 
Publishing. 
Diamond, J. (1999). Guns, germs, and steel:  The fates of human societies. New York: Norton. 
Florida, R. (2004). The flight of the creative class: The new global competition for talent. New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Gans, H. (1994). Positive functions of the undeserving poor: Uses of the underclass in America. 
Politics and Society, 22(3), 269–283. 
Gatewood,  E.  J.,  &  DeLargy,  P.  F.  (1985).  School-based  businesses  in  Georgia.  Retrieved  from 
http://eric.ed.gov/ 
Heinberg, R. (2005). The party’s over: Oil, war, and the fate of industrial societies (2nd ed.). Gabriola 
Island, BC: New Society Publishers.   Eğitim Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi – Journal of Educational Sciences Research 
63 
Hobsbawm, E. (1962). The age of revolution, 1789-1848 (Vol. 1). Cleveland, OH: World Publishing 
Company. 
Hobsbawm, E. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality (2nd ed). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Howley, A., Showalter, D., Howley, M., Howley, C., Klein, R., & Johnson, J. (2011). Challenges 
for place-based mathematics pedagogy in rural schools and communities in the United 
States.  Children,  Youth,  and  Environments,  21  (1),  101-127.  Retrieved  from 
http://www.colorado.edu/journals/cye/21_1/21_1_05_MathematicsPedagogy.pdf 
Jacobs, J. (1961). The death and life of great American cities. New York: Random House. 
Jacobs, J. (1980).  The question of separatism: Quebec and the struggle over sovereignty. New York: 
Random House. 
Jacobs, J. (1986). Cities and the wealth of nations. Harmondsworth, GB: Penguin. 
Jacobs, J. (2004). Dark age ahead. NY: Random House. 
Jacques, M. (2009). When China rules the world: The rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the 
western world. London, UK: Allen Lane. 
Kliebard, H. (1986). The struggle for the American curriculum. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Kunstler,  J.  H.  (2005).  The  long  emergency:  Surviving  the  end  of  oil,  climate  change,  and  other 
converging catastrophes of the twenty-first century. New York: Grove Press. 
Larson,  R.  (1999).  Who’s  minding  the  store?  A  guide  for  educators  working  with  school-based-
enterprises. Macomb, IL: Western Illinois University. Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/ 
Mathez, E. (2009). Climate change: The science of global warming and our energy future.  New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Novak, M. (1981). Toward a theology of the corporation. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Orr, D. (1995a). Earth in mind: On education, environment, and the human prospect. Washington, DC: 
Island Press. 
Orr, D. (1995b). Reruralizing education. In Rooted in the land: Essays on community and place (pp. 
226–234). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Ravitch, D. (2011). The death and life of the great American school system: How testing and choice are 
undermining education. New York: Basic Books. 
Rosenfeld,  S.  (1984).  Something  old,  something  new:  The  wedding  of  rural  education  and  rural 
development. Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov/ 
Rosenthal,  E.  (2013,  March  24).  Life  after  oil  and  gas.  New  York  Times.  Retrieved  from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sunday-review/life-after-oil-and-
gas.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130324 
Said, E. W. (2004). Humanism and democratic criticism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Sassen,  S.  (1996).  Losing  control?  Sovereignty  in  an  age  of  globalization.  New  York:  Columbia 
University Press. 
Sassen, S. (2004). Sociology, globalization, and the re-shaping of the national. Theory Talks (No. 
43). Retrieved from http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/09/theory-talk-43.html 
Scott, J. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.  
64 
 
Scott, J. (2012). Two cheers for anarchism: six easy pieces on autonomy, dignity, and meaningful work 
and play. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Soja, E. (2000). Postmetropolis: Critical studies of cities and regions. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Solomon, S. (2010). Water: The epic struggle for wealth, power, and civilization. New York: Harper 
Perennial. 
United  Nations.  (2006).  World  urbanization  prospects:  The  2005  revision.  New  York:  United 
Nations,  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Population  Division.  Retrieved 
from  http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WUP2005/ 
2005WUPHighlights_Final_Report.pdf 
Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: The modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Williams, R. (1989). The politics of modernism. London: Verso. 
Wright, J. (2009). Sustainable agriculture and food security in an era of oil scarcity: Lessons from Cuba. 
New York: Earthscan. 
 
Atıf için / Please cite as: 
Howley, C. B. (2013). The coming vitality of rural places. Eğitim Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi - 
Journal of Educational Sciences Research, 3 (1), 51–64. http://ebad-jesr.com/ 
 
 